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CASE NOTES
VALIDITY

OF AGREEMENTS

BY

BANK

TO REPURCHASE

BONDS

decision was
rendered by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Knass
et al. v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank et al.1 which may
result in substantial benefit to bank depositors and cestuis of
trust funds, victims of the over-optimistic attitude of a few
years ago of certain Illinois banks as to the stability and permanence of the then current real estate values. The court
construed, for the first time, a statute fifty-four years old, as
authority for holding null and void as against public policy a
bank's agreement to repurchase at par or slight discount, real
estate mortgage bonds which it had sold. Having decided that
such a contract was in contravention of public policy, the court,
naturally, held it unenforceable by any remedy.
This decision distinguishes, if it does not overrule, Wolf v.
National Bank of Illinois,2 the case which for forty-three years
has been cited as authority for a long line of decisions of the
Illinois appellate courts, uniformly adverse to the banks, in cases
where these agreements have been before the Illinois courts.
It appears to have been the practice of the Madison and
Kedzie State Bank to invest heavily in securities on its own
account and also to undertake the sale of such bonds on behalf
of the issuing real estate corporation. The bank appears to
have charged a commission on such sales. The repurchase agreement was to the effect that the bank would repurchase the bonds
"at any time after one year at 99, and after three and one-half
years at par if desired." Some repurchases were made, but after
October, 1929, the bank refused to be bound by the terms of the
agreement or to take back bonds which had been purchased
from it, when requested to do so.
For reasons not essential to this discussion, the action was
brought by bill in equity for specific performance. In view of
the ground on which the court placed its decision, the form of
action is immaterial. If such contracts are held to contravene
public policy, even the remedy in quasi-contract is not available.
The only result of this form of action, as against an action predicated upon the theory of recission, was to let in the defense of
ultra vires. This defense was held ineffective in the courts
below, but the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on this
point before going still further to apply the police power.
If the contract were merely ultra vires, the instant case
SOLD BY IT AS AFFECTED BY PUBLIC PoLICY.-A

1354 Ill. 554, 188 N. E. 836 (1933-Rehearing denied, 1934).
2 178 Ill. 85, 52 N. E. 896 (1899).
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would no longer be authority for denial of recovery, even in
this form of action, for, during the pendency of this case, the
"Business Corporation Act" was passed. This act eliminates
the defense of ultra vires in Illinois 3 in cases where business
corporations are parties. However, since the court went beyond
ultra vires to the ground of public policy, the authority
of the principal case is not impaired by the corporation act.
In preparation for the application of the statute which, in its
opinion, brings the agreement before it within the scope of the
police power, the court lays down a broad doctrine of public
policy, but it uses no language inconsistent with that which has
been expressed and applied in cases already decided, as may be
seen from the following quotation:
"Public policy is a principle of law which holds that no one
may lawfully do that which has a tendency to injure the public
or be against the public good. 4 Banks are quasi-public institutions. Their well-being concerns not only the stockholders, but
the depositors and public at large. Contracts are against public
policy when they tend to injure the public. Agreements such as
are here involved fall within that category. Recent experience,
so general as to afford the basis of judicial notice, has shown
that contracts not within the powers conferred on banks and
which so jeopardize the safety of bank deposits as to result in
their loss, tend to produce widespread injury to the public, and
may properly be held void though there be found no specific
statutory prohibition against them." The qualification in the
concluding phrase is obiter dictum, but it may become significant
in a possible contingency which will be discussed later.
The court found statutory authority for the application of its
doctrine of public policy to condemn the agreement before it in
section 4 of "An Act for the protection of bank depositors,"
approved June 4, 1879, and incorporated into the statutes as a
3 L. 1933, p. 308; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat., 1933, Ch. 32, sec. 8. Under this
statute, ultra vires may be asserted only by the plaintiff (or the prosecution)
in the following cases: (a) In a proceeding by a shareholder to enjoin the
doing of unauthorized acts or the transaction or continuation of unauthorized
business; (b) In a proceeding by the corporation, whether acting directly or
through a receiver, trustee or other legal representative, or through shareholders in a representative suit, against the officers or directors of the corporation for exceeding their authority; (c) In a proceeding by the State to dissolve
the corporation, or in a proceeding by the State to enjoin the corporation from
the transaction of unauthorized business.
4 Although no authority is cited by the court, this definition is that of Greenhood (Greenhood, The Doctrine of Public Policy, 2), who cites it as per
Lord Brougham in Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1 (1853). Page
also uses this definition (Page, The Law of Contracts, sec. 326), and it is
adopted as the definition of the court in People v. Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill.
268 (1889), where the court cites Page.

CASE NOTES

part of the Criminal Code. 5
The public policy aspect of the principal case appears to present three questions:
(1) Is the court sound in its concept of the doctrine of public
policy?
(2) Does the statute in question declare a public policy?
(3) Does the agreement in question fall within the class of
contracts which are declared null and void by the statute?
For purpose of analysis, the first question may be considered
according to whether contracts of banking institutions are so
charged with a public interest that they fall within the ambit of
public policy; and whether the test, "a tendency to injure the
public or to be against the public good," is too broad, as an
attempt to bring within the scope of the police power interests
not included within the ambit of its protection.
The quasi-public nature of banking institutions has been settled by a long line of decisions in all jurisdictions. It is too
well recognized to require citation of authorities, although
Wedesweiler v. Brundage6 and People v. Mueller 7 may be mentioned as recent Illinois cases in which the state's right to control banking activities is recognized.
To lay down a general rule for determining what public interests are included within the protection of the police power, as
against the rights of individuals, is impossible. Such attempt
is met at the outset by the situation well expressed by Mr. Jus-s
tice Holmes in Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter,
where the eminent justice said:
"All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits set
to property by other public interests present themselves as a
branch of what is called the police power of the state. The
boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points in the
5L. 1879, p. 113; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat., 1931, Ch. 38, sec. 64. This
section of the Criminal Code provides that: "It shall not be lawful for any
savings bank, individual or individuals doing banking business, banking company, or incorporated bank receiving savings deposits, or deposits of trust
funds, to assume the payment of, or to become liable for, or to guarantee to
pay the principal of, or interest on, any bonds, notes or other evidence of
indebtedness of, for, or on account of any person or persons, company or
incorporation; and in any assumption, liability or guarantee, whereby such
deposits or trust funds could be jeopardized or impaired, shall be null and
void."
6297 Ill. 228, 130 N. E. 520 (1921).
7352 Ill. 124, 185 N. E. 239 (1933).
8 2 0 9 U. S. 349, 52 L. Ed. 828 (1908).
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line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this
or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side. . . . It
is sometimes difficult to fix boundary stones between the private
right of property and the police power when . . . we know of
few decisions that are very much in point. . . . This public
interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state, and grows
more pressing as population grows."
This language well expresses the fallacy of any attempt at
rigid classification of the public interests to be protected under
the doctrine of public policy. For instance, to define these interests as those of public health, public safety, and public morals,
raises the question of the extent of these interests. "In order
to maintain the balance at the proper boundary," under stress
of economic and population changes, we may have to enlarge
our usual concepts of health, safety, and morals until they include the entire scope of the greater interest properly designated
as the "public good" or the "public welfare," of which health,
safety, and morals are elements.
From this viewpoint, the language of the court in the principal case becomes of especial significance: "Recent experience,
so general as to afford the basis of judicial notice, has shown
that contracts not within the powers conferred on banks and
which so jeopardize the safety of bank deposits as to result in
their loss, tend to produce widespread injury to the public."
So long as the entire conflict produced by the ultra vires contract is confined to that between private rights-the right of the
bank's stockholders to be protected from unauthorized acts of
officers and directors, on the one hand, and the right of the
other contracting party to restitution of benefits conferred in
reliance on such a contract, on the other-public policy is not
interested, and the court will decide the case ex aqueo et bono.
But when the facts and circumstances of the case, in view of
"experience so general as to afford the basis of judicial notice,"
bring into the conflict a third and public interest, the situation
changes. In this case, the public interest was the right of the
public to security of its bank deposits-an essential element of
its right to be safe against such calamities as bank failures, tending to "produce widespread injury to the public." Whether we
designate this interest as "public safety," "public good," or
"public welfare," the point has been reached where the rights
of individuals may no longer "declare themselves absolute to
their logical extreme."
The eminent justice was not announcing a new doctrine when
he stated that the boundary at which the conflicting interests
balance can not be determined by any general formula in advance. In 1824, Mr. Justice Burrough laid down his celebrated
dictum that public policy "is a very unruly horse, and when
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once you get astride it, you never know where it will carry
you."9 In 1887, Justice Kekewich, in Davies v. Davies,10 said:
"Public policy does not admit of definition and is not easily
explained." One thing I take to be clear, and it is this-that
public policy is a variable quantity; that it must vary and does
vary with the habits, capacities, and opportunities of the
public; that it cannot have been the same when Chief Justice
Tindal decided Horner v. Graves,12 in 1831, as it was when
Chief Justice Parker decided Mitchel v. Reynolds,18 in 1711;
that it must have changed, and did change between 1831 and
1869 when Vice-Chancellor James decided Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont,14 and if there had not been a further change
before Lord Justice Fry decided Rousillon v. Rousillon,15 in
1880, it must have occurred ere now."
During the past two or three years, many courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, have shown a strong tendency
to extend rather than to restrict the application of the police
power. This appears most noticeably in cases such as Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,"6 and in other cases
where moratory legislation to relieve the consequences of the
recent collapse of our economic structure has been sustained
against attack on constitutional grounds. The element of
"emergency" has been somewhat stressed in these decisions. It
is not necessary, however, to rely upon cases involving emergency legislation, where the court may have been affected by
economic conditions of the past three or four years, for authority
that "public good" and "public welfare" do not express concepts too broad for use in defining the interests included within
the protection of the police power. Some of the earlier cases
go even farther. Some of them specifically apply the police
power to sustain legislation, not otherwise supportable as constitutional, for protection of bank depositors.
In Manigault v. Springs,17 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1905, Mr. Justice Brown defines the extent
of the police power to include "promotion of the common weal"
and protection of the "public comfort," then concludes: "It
only remains to consider . .. . whether the act of the general
assembly . . . was a proper exercise of the police power of the
state. Of this we have no doubt. Although it was not an exercise of that power in its ordinarily accepted sense of protecting
9 Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229 at p. 252 (1824).
10 36 Ch. Div. 359, 364 (1887).
11 Citing Lord Brougham in Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1 (1853).
12 7 Bing. 735 (1831).
131 P. Wins. 181 (1711).
14L. R. 9 Eq. 35 (1869).

15 14 Ch. Div. 351 (1880).
16 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934)'.
17 199 U. S. 473, 50 L. Ed. 274 (1905).
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the health, lives, and morals of the community, it is defensible
in its broader meaning of providing for the general welfare of
",8
the people ....
Ten years later, in Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Tranbarger,9
Mr. Justice Pitney reiterated the same broad doctrine of the
United States Supreme Court, 20 and stated as settled, the fact
that the police power embraces regulations designed to promote
as
the public convenience or the general welfare and prosperity,
21
well as those of the public health, morals or safety.
In Noble State Bank v. Haskell,22 Mr. Justice Holmes applied
the public policy doctrine directly to the protection of bank
depositors. This case questioned the constitutionality of the
Oklahoma bank guaranty law. The law levied an assessment on
each state bank for the purpose of creating a depositors' guaranty fund to secure the full repayment of deposits, in case it,
or any other bank existing under the state laws, became insolvent. In sustaining the statute as a valid exercise of the police
power of the state, the eminent justice said: "It may be said
in a general way that the police power extends to all the great
public needs.23 It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned
by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare."
In Shallenberger v. First State Bank,24 the United States
Supreme Court followed its previous decision in Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, in reversing the decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Nebraska, 25 which had held
the Nebraska bank guaranty law unconstitutional. In Assaria
State Bank v. Dolley,26 the bank guaranty law of Kansas was
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
18 The court cites Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9
L. Ed. 773 (1837), as authority for the statement that while the police power
is subject to limitations in certain cases, there is a wide discretion on the
part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessarya discretion which courts ordinarily will not interfere with.
19238 U. S. 67, 59 L. Ed. 1204 (1914).
20 Citing Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558, 58
L. Ed. 721, 726 (1914), and cases there cited.
21 Citing Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 292, 43 L.
Ed. 702, 704, 19 S. Ct. 465 (1899) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200
U. S. 561, 592, 50 L. Ed. 596, 609, 26 S. Ct. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175 (1906) ;
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 317, 51 L. Ed. 499, 502, 27 S. Ct. 289 (1907).
22 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. Ed. 112 (1911).
28 The eminent justice here cited Canfield v. U. S., 167 U. S. 518, 42 L. Ed.
260 (1897).
24 219 U. S. 121, 55 L. Ed. 117 (1911).
25 172 F. 999 (1909).
26219 U. S. 121, 55 L. Ed. 123 (1911).
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It appears, therefore, that specific application of the police
power to protection of bank depositors, by whatever term the
interest so protected is defined, has become stare decisis in the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The reason for the failure of the Illinois courts to apply the
police power, heretofore, to protection of bank depositors, by
declaring null and void repurchase agreements of banks, must be
sought elsewhere than in a narrow concept of the interests to
be protected by the police power. The Illinois Supreme Court,
by dictum and decision, has expressly adopted the doctrine of
Davies v. Davies, heretofore cited, and subsequent cases which
have recognized the fallacy of attempts to reduce public policy
to any formulary definition. The reason for failure of such
specific application will be discussed later, in considering the
third main question presented by the principal case.
In Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank,2 7 the contract
under question was one between physician and patient, whereby
the physician agreed to furnish medical attention to the patient
as long as she should live. The consideration was $100,000, payable out of the patient's estate after her death. After the patient
died, the personal representative of the decedent refused to
perform the contract. The ground for refusal was that the
agreement was an incentive to commission of crime and also a
wager of the continuance of the patient's life, hence void as
against public policy. In holding the agreement valid, the court
said:
"There is no precise definition of public policy, and consequently no absolute rule by which a contract can be measured
or tested to determine whether or not it is contrary to public
policy ....

The public policy of the State or of the nation is to

be found in its constitution and its statutes, and when cases
arise concerning matters upon which they are silent, then in its
judicial decisions and the constant practice of the government
officials. ''28
In Brush v. City of Carbondale,29 it was held that whether or
not a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the
court to determine from all the circumstances of each case. In
27 245 Ill. 180, 91 N. E. 1041 (1910). This doctrine is reiterated practically
verbatim in Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 296 fI1. 104, 129 N. E.
546 (1921), as ground for its decision that a contract waiving a constitutional
or statutory right or an established rule of law is not void on the theory that
it is against public policy, unless it is injurious in some way to the interests
of society.
28 In support of this statement of its doctrine, the court cites Bell v. Farwell,
176 Ill. 489, 52 N. E. 346 (1898); Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Il1.
551, 55 N. E. 577 (1899) ; and People v. Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N. E.
798 (1889). See also reference to the Gas Trust Co. case in footnote 4.
29 229 Ill. 144, 82 N. E. 252 (1907).
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Union Trust & Savings Bank v. Kinloch Long Distance Telephone Company,30 it was decided that a public service corporation-in this case a telephone company-owes a duty to the
public, and it cannot, without the consent of the state, disable
itself from performing any part of the functions which its
charter authorizes it to perform. A contract so to disable itself
was held to be a violation of its duty to the state, and void as
against public policy. Crichfield v. The Bermudez Asphalt Paving Company3' and Thomas v. The First National Bank of
Belleville3 2 could probably be brought under the classification
of "contracts against public morality." Other Illinois cases
where the police power has been applied have involved contracts in which the claim to illegality was based upon considerations of public health, safety, or morality. 3 None of them, however, contains language which appears to indicate that the court
considered itself bound to limit the application of the police
power to these interests.
Because the doctrine of public policy can not, apparently, be
confined within narrow formulary limits; because there is so
much principle and authority in support of the broad basis
upon which the court, in the principal case, rests its doctrine
of public policy; and because there is specific authority of the
United States Supreme Court for application of the doctrine
to the very question before the court, the first question presented would seem to require an affirmative answer-the court
announces a sound general doctrine.
The second problem presented is one of statutory construction.
Does the particular section of the statute which the court has
applied to the contract declare a public policy?
In determining whether a particular statute evidences a legislative intent to declare a public policy, the historical background
of the statute is important. By ascertaining the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the legislation in question, and
the conditions which it was designed to remedy, we may determine whether such facts, circumstances, and conditions presented a proper case for the application of the police power. Mr.
Justice Dunn, in delivering the opinion of the court in People
v. Gould,34 has given us the historical background of "An Act
for the protection of bank depositors." This opinion also expressly recognizes this statute as an exercise, by the legislature,
30258 111. 202, 101 N. E. 535 (1913).
31174 111. 466, 51 N. E. 552 (1898).
32 213 Ill.
261, 72 N. E. 801 (1904).
33 Beadles v. Bless, 27 Ill. 320 (1862); Goodrich v. Tenney, 144 Il. 422, 33

N. E. 44 (1893).
84345 Ill. 288, 178 N. E. 133 (1931).
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of the police power of the state. It was section 1 of the act
which was then before the court, but in their historical aspect
and in recognition of the act as an exercise of the police power,
the court's remarks apply to the entire act:
"At the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1870, many
incorporated banks existed in Illinois, some under special laws
enacted by the legislature, others under the act of 185135 to
establish a general system of banking. . . . All of these banks
and banking corporations, whether organized under the general
Banking law of 1851 or under special statutes, were recognized
by sections 2, 5 and 7 of article 11 of the constitution of 1870
and treated as validly organized corporations. 6 Besides the incorporated banking associations there were in the State many
individuals and partnerships doing a banking business over
whom the State exercised no supervision, and many national
banks organized under the Federal laws and subject to the
supervision of the Federal government. The act of 1851 provided in considerable detail for the security of the note holder
. . but no special provision for the security of depositors was
made except to require a full statement of the bank's affairs as
of the first Monday of January, April, July, and October to be
transmitted to the Auditor and published in the nearest newspaper. Whether or not this section [Art. 11. sec. 5] repealed the
Banking act of 1851 is not material, for that act was expressly
repealed by the general Repealing act of the Revised Statutes
(chap. 131, sec. 1, par. 172) which took effect on July 1, 1874.
"Thus the law stood, with no statute authorizing the organization of corporations with banking powers in Illinois, when the
Thirty-first General Assembly on June 4, 1879, passed 'An act
for the protection of bank depositors.' . . .
"It has been observed that in 1870 the banking business of
this State was conducted by many so-called private banks which
were not incorporated, by a number of incorporated banks having special charters, and by some banks incorporated under the
Banking act of 1851. Any person who chose to, could become a
private banker if he had a few thousand dollars of his own or
could secure a few thousand dollars by borrowing or associating
somebody with him as a partner who had the money. He was
not required to report his assets and liabilities or the condition
of his business to anyone and was not subject to the examination
of any public officers as to his financial ability to respond to the
demands of his depositors. Their dependence for the payment
of their deposits was in the business ability, honesty and good
fortune of the banker, and too often these failed them. Failures
*

Laws of 1851, p. 163.
36 The court here cites People v. Loewenthal, 93 IMl.191 (1879).
35
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were frequent and they were often disastrous. Therefore in 1879
the legislature, in the exercise of the police power, passed the
act. . . . This act was passed, not as an amendment to the
Criminal Code and not as an amendment to any act authorizing
or creating a corporation with banking powers, but as an independent act to protect bank depositors....
"This was the condition of the law when the Thirty-fifth General Assembly passed 'An act concerning corporations with
banking powers,' 37 which was approved by the Governor on
June 16, 1.887 .... At the November election, 1888, the act was
approved by the vote of the people and became a law ....
"This act contained no penal provisions whatever ....Neither
section 76 nor section 25a (as section 1 of the act of June 4,
1879, was then known) of the Criminal Code was referred to or
affected by the act, but the officers of the banking corporations
authorized by it became subject to these criminal laws, as were
the officers of all other banks."
The title of the act, together with this historical background,
would appear to be cogent evidence of the public policy intent
of the legislature in enacting this statute. Its cogency is certainly strengthened by the express recognition of the act by the
Illinois Supreme Court as an exercise of the police power.
The court, in the principal case, finds evidence of the intent
of the legislature to declare contracts of the character before
it void as against the public policy of the state in the fact that
the statute was enacted, as its title indicates, for the protection
of bank depositors. For its statement that its enactment was
for the public generally and should be construed to carry out
that purpose, the court finds authority in People v. Tallmadge,38
another case in which section 1 of the act was before the court.
In passing on the constitutionality of the act, the court thus
construed its purpose:
"The purpose of the statute undoubtedly was to protect the
public from being induced to deposit money, or property of like
import, with insolvent bankers, and time and experience have
demonstrated to us that there was ample reason, if not a real
necessity, for such legislation. Ordinarily a penal statute should
be strictly construed, and though this statute is penal in its
nature yet it is one enacted for the benefit of the public generally and should receive a fair and reasonable construction."
Although the court in the Tallmadge case refers to the statute as "penal in its nature" and the statute appears as part
of the Criminal Code, it is doubtful whether section 4 is penal, at
least in the strict sense. Section 1, which was under considera37 Laws of 1887, p. 89. This act was repealed by the act of 1919, (L. 1919,
p. 224, Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 16a, pars. 1.18).
3 328 1l. 210, 159 N. E. 319 (1927).

CASE NOTES

tion in the Tallmadge case, is undoubtedly penal, but section 4,
in the principal case, inflicts no penalty on those who, by its
terms, are forbidden to enter into the class of contracts which it
condemns. The fact is distinctly otherwise. Although it is the
action of the bank which is declared unlawful, application of
the "penalty" by declaring the agreement void, is the very
result the bank is seeking to accomplish in order to avoid a heavy
loss. However, a statute need not be penal in order to express
a public policy, although the fact that it is penal often makes
more certain its construction as so intended. Where the public
policy object may be accomplished by a remedial statute, the
law may be content, as between the parties, especially when they
are in pari delicto, to inflict no specific penalty upon either
party. It may "let the loss lie where it falls" so long as the
public interest is protected. The object of section 4 is to avoid
one of the causes which often leads to the necessity of applying
the penalty of section 1. Section 1 merely inflicts a penalty upon
the banker who receives deposits after his bank becomes insolvent. The purpose of section 4 is to prevent the insolvency
by the removal of one of its frequent causes-assumption of the
liability of a guarantor or surety.
Apparently, the second question presented also requires an
affirmative answer. The court's construction of the statute
which it applied to the contract before it, as expressing a legislative intent to declare a public policy, appears to be well
supported.
Consideration of the third and final question-whether the
agreement in the principal case comes within the class of contracts declared null and void by statute-will involve a discussion of previous Illinois decisions. Previous decisions, where
agreements of banks to repurchase bonds sold by them have
been involved, have uniformly required the banks to repurchase
the bonds--usually at a heavy loss.
First, however, it may be well to consider the argument advanced that the bonds and repurchase agreements were not
evidence of indebtedness of another, but were the obligations
of the bank itself, and therefore that the statute would not
apply. It is difficult to conceive on what ground these bonds
could be considered obligations of the bank. A bank, of course,
is liable for its indorsements on commercial paper, but these
bonds were not commercial paper, nor could the repurchase
agreements be considered as endorsements. Bearer bonds such
as those in question pass from hand to hand without indorsement. Title passes by delivery, and no liability ever accrues to
the holders unless, as in the principal case, such liability is voluntarily assumed by a vendee by execution of a collateral agreement such as was executed by the bank in this case.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

Regardless of ownership, these bonds remain the obligations
of the mortgagor. In entering into the agreement to redeem
them, therefore, the bank was, in effect, guaranteeing to the
purchaser the value of the mortgagor's obligations. In fact, the
bank's obligation appears to have passed beyond the secondary
liability of a mere guarantor, and to have more nearly approached the primary liability of a surety. A guarantor agrees
to redeem if the principal obligor fails to do so. The bank's
agreement was to redeem upon demand, without regard to any.
action of the mortgagor. The contract contained the additional
element of certainty that redemption would not be called for
except under circumstances which would involve loss to the
bank. So long as the value of the bonds was more than that
guaranteed by the bank, no purchaser would return them. The
bank could not even mitigate its loss by calling for execution of
the repurchase agreement when the market first started to decline. No matter how great the shrinkage of real estate values,
redemption was entirely at the option of the purchaser. He
could "hold on" waiting for a "turn of the market" until the
termination of the period covered by the agreement, and then,
by the exercise of his option, throw the entire loss upon the
bank.
The nature of this agreement and its inherent danger to bank
deposits and trust funds--especially in view of the large sums
for which such real estate bond issues were "floated" and marketed through the banks during the "real estate boom'"-would
undoubtedly have been decisive of the case, except for the
influence of Wolf v. National Bank of Illinois39 This case has
been cited as primary authority in all previous cases, including
the principal case in the Appellate Court, for permitting recovery against the banks on such repurchase agreements. Plaintiff,
in the principal case, cited the Wolf case as authority for the
contention that the agreement was not a repurchase contract,
but a conditional sales contract-that the bonds were taken on
condition that they might be returned-and that such a contract is enforceable.
In the Wolf case, the bank sold Wolf bonds of the Chicago
Auditorium Association, considered staple bonds, with an agreement to repurchase on demand, either at the price sold or at
par with interest. The receiver of the bank refused to accept
the bonds on demand or recognize any obligation by reason of
the repurchase agreement. Wolf brought an action at law for
breach of the contract. The only defense offered was that the
agreement was in contravention of the "Gambling in Futures
89 178 111. 85, 52 N. E. 896 (1899).
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Act" 40 of Illinois, and therefore null and void as a gambling
transaction. As against this defense, the court held that the
contract, construed as a whole, was a conditional sale with the
right reserved by the plaintiff to return the bonds. This construction was placed on the ground that the obvious intention
of the parties was to make a conditional sale, the condition being
that the bank should take the bonds back at the price paid,
within a specified time, if the plaintiff desired to return them.
In other words, the court held that the plaintiff had the right,
during the stipulated time, to elect whether he would keep the
bonds or return them, and in case he decided to return them,
was entitled to his money back with interest.
The Wolf case can be distinguished from the principal case,
if such distinction is important, by the fact that in the Wolf
case the bank sold bonds to which it had acquired title, having
purchased them for its own investment. In the principal case,
the bank had never acquired title to the bonds, but appears to
have been merely acting as a sales agent.
Whether or not the transaction in the Wolf case was properly
held to be a conditional sale, or that in the principal case could
properly be so held, would appear immaterial, in view of the
ground upon which the principal case was decided. There is
authority for the view that a sale on condition subsequent may
properly be designated a conditional sale, 41 although the weight
of authority is decidedly in favor of the view that the term "conditional sale" has acquired a special significance, and has come
to mean a sale where the passage of title to property is subject
to a condition, and that condition is precedent and not subsequent. This view is codified by the definition of a "conditional
sale" in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. 42 The minority view
has been criticized 48 as unfortunate and tending to confusion.
Under the defense raised in the principal case, it is immaterial
whether the transaction is designated as a "conditional sale,"
"sale on condition subsequent," "vent6 a remfr6," "sale or
return," or other technical term. The property sold by the bank
was the obligation of the mortgagor. The condition subsequent
was for the purpose of protecting the purchaser against depreciation in the value of the obligation; to remove, as to him, the
speculative element and thus induce him to make the purchase.
-It may well be reasoned that such a condition subsequent is, in
fact, a guarantee of the obligation of another and therefore
40 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, par. 308 (Act of 18-74).
41 Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 198 (1868); Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice
Co., 64 Minn. 307, 67 N. W. 70 (1896); Ophir Consolidated Mines Co. v.
Brynteson, 143 F. 829 (1906).
422 U. L. A., Sec. 1 (1924).
48 Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2a U. L. A., See. 4 (1924);
see also Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sees. 270-272 (1924).
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within the prohibition of the act of 1879-even though the
transaction may be technically designated a "conditional sale."
Whether or not it was necessary to hold the contract in the
Wolf case a conditional sale, in order to avoid declaring it a
gambling contract, is immaterial to the purpose of this discussion. Our only interest is in the effect of the case on subsequent
decisions. In the Wolf case, no question was raised of ultra
vires or public policy, except on the question of gambling. The
case, therefore, stands only as authority for this point and has
no value as an authority where the "Act for the protection
of bank depositors" is raised.
In Freedman v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank,4 4 the action
was at law on a repurchase contract identical with that in the
principal case. The court sustained a recovery against the defense of ultra vires on the ground that a corporation for
pecuniary profit has power to purchase its own bonds, and
that a sale with an agreement to repurchase is only a conditional
rather than an absolute sale. The fallacy of the argument that
in such case the bank is "purchasing its own bonds," has already been indicated. The court cites Wolf v. National Bank of
Illinois and other Illinois authorities, 45 but the Wolf case is the
only one cited where a bank was involved. As to the Wolf case,
the court said: "It is true ... that the precise question of ultra
vires was not raised in the briefs or considered in the opinion
of the court; but as the parties to that suit were represented
by able counsel, they would not have missed the point had it
been deemed available." Apparently counsel for banks, usually
very able, have been overlooking the significance of the act of
1879 for nearly half a century.
Regarding the possible effect of an act such as that of 1879,
the court, in the Freedman case, said: "We are not cited to any
statute which forbids expressly such contracts as was here made;
and on the plainest principles we think defendent is estopped
to set up that defense. Even if a statute expressly forbade it,
there would remain the question of whether it was the intention
of the legislature, by the enactment of the statute, to make such
a contract wholly void as contrary to public policy."
The next agreement of this nature to come before the Illinois
46
Appellate Court was Awotin v. Atlas Exchange National Bank.
To sustain the defense of ultra vires, the defense invoked the
proviso of the National Banking Act limiting a national bank's
111. App. 519 (1931).
Ward v. Johnson, 95 II. 215 (1880); Stewart v. Dodson, 282 fI1. 192, 118
N. E. 405 (1918) ; Roush v. Illinois Oil Co., 180 Ill. App. 346 (1913); Hills v.
Hopp, 210 Ill. App. 365 (1919); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., v. The
Phillips Co., 230 Ill. App. 38 (1923).
46265 Ill. App. 238 (1932).
44259
45
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business of buying and selling investment securities to such
buying and selling without recourse. 47 The court permitted a
quasi-contractual recovery of the amount paid for the bonds plus
accrued interest, "even if the agreement to repurchase could
be considered ultra vires in view of the above subsection 7." The
defense of "conditional sale" was also sustained on the authority of the Wolf case. The court quoted from that case,
inter alia:
"Is it contrary to law or justice, or does it violate any rule
of public policy, for a person to sell a horse, a cow, a promissory
note or a bond for a specified sum and agree to take the article
back within a given time for the same price? If it is, this contract might be condemned; otherwise not." Apparently the
court, in the Wolf case and the Appellate Court in its subsequent quotation in the Awotin case, overlooked the fact that
neither the Federal statute nor the act of 1879 is directed to
the sale of horses or cows by banks, or of promissory notes or
bonds by individuals.
The Awotin case also cites the Freedman case to the effect
that a bank's agreement to repurchase bonds sold, on certain
conditions, is a valid agreement; and as to the possible effect
of a statute expressly prohibiting such an agreement.
The principal case appears to be the first in which section
4 of the act of 1879 was definitely presented to the Illinois
Appellate Court. That court considered the defense of ultra
vires settled by the Freedman case, stating that, while the
act in question was not specifically called to its attention in that
case, it was presented to the Supreme Court for consideration
upon the application for certiorari, which was denied. It also
cites the Awotin case as one where the defense of ultra vires
was held unavailable. It also calls attention to Madison and
Kedzie Trust and Savings Bank v. Dean.48 In that case, the
defendant in the principal case attempted to sustain a judgment
by confession entered upon a note taken under circumstances
substantially similar to those of the principal case. The motion
to open the confession judgment had been denied in the court
below, but was reversed and remanded by the Appellate Court.
The case is reported in abstract only, but the court, in the principal case below, states that the statute was considered. The
Appellate Court also cites Hoffman v. Sears Community State
Bank, 49 also reported in abstract only, as one in which the
statute in question as well as a number of cases which it was
there insisted had not been called t6 the attention of the court
in previous cases, received consideration.
S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5136, subsec. 7.
48 263 111.App. 646 (1931).
49269 111.App. 644 (1933).
47 U.
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Since the decision was rendered in the principal case, however, Hoffman v. Sears Community State Bank has gone to the
Illinois Supreme Court on certiorari. 50 The Supreme Court
followed its decision in the prncipal case, reversed the Appellate
Court and held the bond repurchase agreement null and void as
against public policy. The court said: "The contract in question, upon which the plaintiff bases his claim against the defendant, is similar to the contract of re-purchase considered by
this court in Knass v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank. 51 The
contract was there held to be prohibited by law and not enforceable against a banking corporation organized under the laws
of this State. We see no reason to depart from the conclusion
reached in that case and we adhere to the legal conclusion
reached therein. "
In the Hoffman case, it was argued that section 4 of the act
of 1879 had been repealed by the general banking law of 1919,52
being inconsistent with sections 1, 9 and 10 of the general Banking act, in that section 4 of the act of 1879 imposes a limitation
53
on the powers of banks. The court, citing People v. Gould,
held that there was no inconsistency, when the object and purpose of the Banking act and of the provision of the Criminal
Code are considered as a whole, and hence there was no repeal
by implication.
It was further contended that section 4 of the act of 1879
is unconstitutional, being violative of section 5 of article 11 of
the state constitution. 54 The court refused to pass on the constitutional question, on the ground that it had not been raised
in the courts below and could not be raised, for the first time,
in the Supreme Court. 55 It is doubtful if the act of 1879 is open
to the constitutional objection raised. Even in the contingency
that a subsequent case may reach the Supreme Court with this
constitutional question properly raised, and the act should be
declared unconstitutional, it is probable that the result would
50356 Il. 598, 191 N. E. 280 (1934).

51269 Ill. App. 588 (1933).

Ch. 16a, pars. 1, 9, 10.
53 345 111. 288, 178 N. E. 133 (1931).
54 This section provides: "No State bank shall hereafter be created, nor
shall the State own or be liable for any stock in any corporation or joint-stock
company or association for banking purposes, now created, or to be hereafter
created. No Act of the General Assembly authorizing or creating corporations
or associations with banking powers, whether of issue, deposit or discount, nor
amendments thereto, shall go into effect or in any manner be in force unless
the same shall be submitted to a vote of the people at the general election next
succeeding the passage of the same, and be approved by a majority of all the
votes cast at such election for or against such law."
55 The decision in People ex. rel. Carr v. Murray, 357 Ill. 326, 192 N. E.
198 (1934), may indicate a change in the attitude of the Illinois Supreme
Court on this point.
52 L. 1919, p. 224; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933),

CASE NOTES

257

be the same as in the principal ease. Here, the dictum in the
principal case, already referred to, becomes of significance in
forecasting the probable decision. The court, in declaring its
public policy doctrine, expresses the opinion that such contracts
may properly be held void "though there be found no specific
statutory provision against them." Strong expressions indicating a similar point of view are found in many of the decisions
of this court already cited.
Heretofore, astute bond buyers have been able to avoid the
speculative element from such purchases by buying through
an Illinois bank. By securing from the bank a repurchase agreement, the speculative element has been thrown entirely upon
the bank. It appears now, however, that the protection heretofore uniformly given to such contracts by the Illinois courts is
at an end, and that the contrary point of view has become, or is
well on its way to become, stare decisis in Illinois.
H. N. OSGOOD

